The basic insight of social contract theory is that coercion must be justified to those subject to it. Social morality, including political institutions, is often coercive. Ergo, it requires justification…

“Between Heteronomy and Anarchy: Kant’s Reformulation of the Social Contract” (Kant and the Scottish Enlightenment) — I explore Kant’s social contract theory as a response to Humean criticisms. By looking closely at the criticisms that Hume levels against social contract theory — viz. its historical inaccuracy, its psychological implausibility, and its erroneous normative foundation — one can better appreciate the nuances and idiosyncrasies of Kant’s version of social contract theory.

“Unravelling into War: Trust and Social Preferences in Hobbes’s State of Nature” (Economics and Philosophy) — Jin-yeong Sohn and I apply game theory to reconstruct Hobbes’s argument. Our model improves upon past attempts to formally represent Hobbes’s derivation of war from the state of nature.

“Exit and Isolation: Rousseau’s State of Nature” (Synthese) — Mario Iván Juárez García and I reconstruct Rousseau’s argument in the Second Discourse. We identify the precise conditions under which Rousseau’s critique would effectively refute the Hobbesian claim that the state of nature will always devolve into a state of war.

“Rationality, Uncertainty, and Unanimity: An Epistemic Critique of Contractarianism” (Economics and Philosophy) — I apply a game-theoretical model to argue that contractarian theories of justice face an unnoticed epistemic issue related to strategic choice.

In Progress

“Robust Reconciliation” (forthcoming, Oxford University Press) — I develop an agent-based model to examine endogenous coordination — or its failure — within evolving social-moral systems.